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IV 
JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Whether the trial court properly determined that Defendant was not engaged 
in substantial and continuous local activity, tantamount to doing business, sufficient to 
confer general personal jurisdiction. 
Standard of Review: An appeal from a pretrial jurisdictional decision presents 
only legal questions that are reviewed for correctness. Arguello v. Industrial 
Woodworking Machine Co., 838 P.2d 1120, 1121 (Utah 1992). 
However, to the extent Plaintiff is attacking the trial court's finding that 
Defendant's leasing real property in Wendover, Utah, was related to, but not necessary 
to, its hotel and casino business in Nevada, the standard is clearly erroneous. Alta 
Indus. Ltd. v. Hurst, 846 P.2d 1282, 1286 (Utah 1993). 
It should be noted, too, that the matter was scheduled for an evidentiary hearing 
below. Record at 269, p.27. Plaintiff declined to present evidence at the evidentiary 
hearing. Record at 270. 
2. Whether the trial court properly determined that Plaintiff's injuries did not 
arise out of Defendant's contacts with Utah and that Utah's long arm statute thus did 
not confer specific personal jurisdiction over Defendant. 
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Standard of Review. An appeal from a pretrial jurisdictional decision presents 
only legal questions that are reviewed for correctness. Arguello v. Industrial 
Woodworking Machine Co., 838 P.2d 1120, 1121 (Utah 1992). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUES 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-24 (1996) provides in pertinent part: 
Any person . . . whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, 
who in person or through an agent does any of the following enumerated 
acts, submits himself . . . to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state as 
to any claim arising from: 
(1) the transaction of any business within this state; 
(3) the causing of any injury within this state whether tortious or 
by breach of warranty . . . . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case. Plaintiff sued State Line Hotel, Inc., a Nevada corporation, 
for personal injuries she sustained in a slip and fall which occurred in the food buffet 
line at State Line's hotel and casino property in Wendover, Nevada. Plaintiff's 
complaint sounds in negligence. Record at 1-4. 
Course of Proceedings Below. State Line Hotel did not answer Plaintiff's 
complaint, but filed its Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint Based on Lack of 
Personal Jurisdiction. Record at 14-16. After the motion was fully briefed, it was 
argued on June 30, 1997. The trial court made a partial ruling, see record at 269, p. 
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26-27, and set the matter for an evidentiary hearing, allowing limited discovery in the 
interim. Record at 269, p. 27-28. 
Plaintiff sent interrogatories and requests for documents to State Line, and the 
evidentiary hearing proceeded on September 15, 1997. Plaintiff chose not to present 
evidence at the hearing, record at 270, but submitted a supplemental memorandum 
prior to the hearing. Record at 104-62. 
The trial court granted State Line Hotel's motion to dismiss. Record at 247-52, 
270, p. 20-23, and Plaintiff appealed. 
Statement of Facts. 
1. The State Line Hotel, Inc. is a Nevada corporation which owns and 
operates the State Line Hotel and Casino in Wendover, Nevada. Record at 11-12, 248. 
2. On July 29, 1995, Plaintiff slipped and fell on the premises of the State 
Line Hotel and Casino while going through a food buffet line. Record at 1-4, 248. 
3. State Line Hotel advertises its Nevada hotel and casino in Utah. Record 
at 12, 248. 
4. State Line Hotel contracts for goods and services from entities in several 
states including Utah and Nevada. Record at 12, 249. 
5. At the time of Plaintiffs fall, State Line Hotel contracted with State Line 
Properties, Ltd., a Utah limited partnership, which took reservations from Utah 
residents for hotel rooms, golf packages, gaming tournaments, shows, and 
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entertainment. The general partner of State Line Properties, Ltd., was State Line 
Properties, Inc., a Utah corporation. Record at 12. 
6. State Line Hotel, the Nevada corporate defendant, owns stock in the Utah 
corporation, State Line Properties. State Line Properties, Inc. and State Line 
Properties, Ltd., along with several other entities, are named insureds under the same 
insurance policy as State Line Hotel, Inc. Record at 249. 
7. State Line Properties, Inc. and State Line Properties, Ltd. own five 
parcels of real property in Wendover, Utah, which they lease to State Line Hotel, Inc. 
Two of the parcels are used for parking lot, parking structure, and signage purposes 
relating to Defendant's hotel and casino business. The city of Wendover leases a 
storage unit at Decker Field to State Line Hotel. Record at 249. 
8. State Line's leasing of incidental parcels of real property including 
signage and parking areas, while directly related to the carrying on of its business in 
Nevada, is not an integral part of the business in the sense that the hotel and casino 
could not continue without it. Record at 249. 
9. State Line Hotel does not own any real property in Utah. Record at 249. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
I. The activities of the State Line Hotel are not substantial and continuous and 
tantamount to doing business in Utah. The business of the State Line Hotel is operating 
a hotel and casino in Nevada. In carrying out this business, it contracts with vendors 
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from Nevada and other states, including Utah, for goods and services. It advertises its 
business in Utah and other states. It leases some parcels of real property in Wendover, 
Utah, for purposes related to its business in Nevada. The leases are incidental, but not 
necessary, to carrying on its hotel and casino business. 
Plaintiffs injuries did not arise from State Line's contacts with Utah. 
Moreover, State Line Hotel's contacts with Utah are not so substantial and continuous 
as to constitute doing business in Utah. State Line Hotel would not have reasonably 
anticipated being haled into court in Utah for any lawsuit. 
The majority of courts have held that advertising and promoting one's business 
in another state do not constitute doing business. Cases relied on by plaintiff are 
distinguishable and involve significantly more contact than mere promotion of business. 
In addition, Plaintiff relies on cases which have been reversed for the notion that but 
for the State Line's advertising in Utah, she would not have gone to Wendover, slipped 
in the food buffet line, and been injured. 
Since State Line's activities in Utah do not constitute doing business, there is no 
general personal jurisdiction over State Line Hotel. 
II. Unquestionably, Plaintiffs injuries did not arise out of State Line Hotel's (1) 
entering into transactions in Utah, or (2) causing an injury in Utah. Thus, there is no 
specific personal jurisdiction over State Line Hotel. Even if there were, however, the 
court must employ a due process analysis to determine whether State Line Hotel could 
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reasonably anticipate being haled into court in Utah and must balance the forum state's 
interest in the litigation with that of the foreign state and the parties. 
In this case, again, Plaintiff's injuries did not arise from any conduct of State 
Line Hotel in Utah. As stated in Plaintiff's complaint, State Line's alleged misconduct 
was in failing to provide reasonably safe premises. Thus, State Line Hotel could not 
reasonably anticipate being haled into court in Utah for Plaintiff's slip and fall which 
occurred in Nevada. 
Utah does not have nearly the interest in adjudicating Plaintiff s claim as does 
Nevada, a state with a strong interest in ensuring that hotels and casinos are maintained 
in a reasonably safe condition. Plaintiff's interest in having her claim efficiently and 
fairly litigated would have been promoted in Nevada. 
Accordingly, Utah's long arm statute does not confer specific personal 
jurisdiction over State Line Hotel. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THIS COURT DOES NOT HAVE GENERAL PERSONAL 
JURISDICTION OVER THE DEFENDANT 
Jurisdiction over the person is broken down into two categories. A court can 
have general jurisdiction or specific personal jurisdiction over a defendant. The Utah 
Supreme Court has stated: 
6 
General personal jurisdiction permits a court to exercise power over a 
defendant without regard to the subject of the claim asserted. For such 
jurisdiction to exist, the defendant must be conducting substantial and 
continuous local activity in the forum state. In contrast, specific personal 
jurisdiction gives a court power over a defendant only with respect to 
claims arising out of the particular activities of the defendant in the forum 
state. For such jurisdiction to exist, the defendant must have certain 
minimum local contacts. 
Arguello v. Industrial Woodworking Machine Co., 838 P.2d 1120, 1122 (Utah 1992) 
(emphasis added) (citing Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 
414 (1984); Abbot G.M. Diesel, Inc., v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 578 P.2d 850, 853 n.6 
(Utah 1978)). 
In Mallory Engineering, Inc. v. TedR. Brown & Associates, Inc., 618 P.2d 
1004 (Utah 1980), the Supreme Court explained the distinction between the "minimal 
contact" and "doing business" standards. 
The significance of the difference is found in part in the distinction 
between general jurisdiction and special jurisdiction. If the defendant's 
nexus with the state is such that he is "doing business" in the state, the 
jurisdiction of the court applies generally and he is rendered amenable in 
the state courts for any cause of action. This jurisdictional standard is 
embodied in U.R.C.P. § 4(e)(4), and the Long Arm Statute need not be 
employed. Conversely, if the activities of the defendant are limited in 
nature or transitory in duration, the courts may assume jurisdiction over 
that person only in relation to causes of action related to the activity of the 
defendant in the state. To assume this "special" jurisdiction, the courts 
must employ the Long Arm Statute. 
Id. at 1006 n.4 (citing Producer's Livestock Loan Co. v. Miller, 580 P.2d 603, 605 
(Utah 1978); Strachan, In Personam Jurisdiction in Utah, 1977 Utah L. Rev. 235 
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(1977)). See alsQ Abbot G.M. Diesel, 578 P.2d at 853 n.6, wherein the court, quoting 
the Strachan article, stated that general personal jurisdiction requires "substantial and 
continuous local activity"; Burt Drilling, Inc. v. Portadrill, 608 P.2d 244 (Utah 1980) 
(defendant was not doing business in Utah which would require substantial and 
continuous activity; defendant did not sell products for use in Utah except to plaintiff). 
A. Advertising in Another State is Generally Insufficient 
to Confer General Personal Jurisdiction 
Virtually all individual and corporate residents of states have some contact with 
other states. State Line Hotel purchases advertising in Utah and contracts with Utah 
vendors for the supply of food products and supplies. Record at 12. In regard to 
advertising, State Line Hotel is like any other lodging or entertainment operation 
located in one state which promotes its business to citizens of another state. Many 
courts have held that advertising and promotion are not "doing business" sufficient to 
give rise to general jurisdiction. 
In State ex rel. Circus Circus Reno, Inc. v. Pope, 317 Or. 151, 854 P.2d 461 
(1993), an Oregon resident traveled to Reno, Nevada, and stayed at a hotel operated by 
Circus Circus. The plaintiff was injured when he was hit by a liquor bottle thrown by 
an unknown person from a window of the hotel. He sued Circus Circus, claiming 
negligence. In Oregon, general jurisdiction can be obtained over a defendant who is 
engaged in "substantial and not isolated activities within this state." 854 P.2d at 462. 
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The plaintiff argued that Circus Circus was subject to the state's general jurisdiction. 
The Court listed the contacts of Circus Circus with Oregon: 
It is undisputed by the parties that Circus Circus is not registered to 
do business in Oregon, pays no business tax here, and has no bank 
accounts, offices, real estate, employees, or exclusive agents in the state. 
[Plaintiff] argues, however, that the activities of Circus Circus in Oregon 
nevertheless are "substantial," because Circus Circus "regularly advertises 
its Reno hotel in The Oregonian, because it distributed brochures 
describing that hotel to Smith's Oregon travel agent, because it maintains 
a toll-free number for use of Oregon residents, and because, after Smith 
reserved a room at its Reno hotel, Circus Circus called Smith at his 
Oregon residence to confirm the reservation." 
Id. 
The court stated that it was not persuaded that the foregoing activities were 
substantial and not isolated activities within the state. The court then rejected the 
specific jurisdiction argument because the immediate effects of the plaintiff's injury 
were felt within Nevada and not within Oregon as required by Oregon's long-arm 
statute. Id. at 463. 
InMunley v. Second Judicial District Court, 761 P.2d 414 (Nev. 1988), the 
plaintiff, a Nevada resident, was injured at a Lake Tahoe ski resort called "Northstar." 
He sued Northstar in Nevada but Northstar claimed a lack of personal jurisdiction. The 
court listed Northstar's contacts with Nevada: 
The evidence presented to the district court shows that Northstar's 
contacts with Nevada consisted solely of advertising and promotional 
activities. These activities included continuous membership in the 
Reno/Sparks Chamber of Commerce since 1984, the maintenance of a 
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contract with a Reno outdoor advertising company, the placement of one 
advertisement in the Las Vegas Review Journal, the placement of an 
advertisement in the Reno telephone directory, and the distribution of 
brochures to several ski shops and sporting goods stores in the Reno area. 
Id. at 415. 
The court in Munley rejected any argument that the requirements for general 
jurisdiction had been met. "None of Northstar's promotional activities evince a pattern 
of 'substantial and continuous' activities within this state sufficient to give rise to a 
presence in Nevada and to confer general jurisdiction on the district court." Id. at 
416. 
Similarly, in Congoleum Corp. v. D.L.W. Aktiengesellschaft, 729 F.2d 1240 
(9th Cir. 1984), the court of appeals affirmed a district court's dismissal of the 
complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction over the German defendant. In that case, the 
defendant's only activities in the forum state of California consisted of sales and 
marketing efforts through a California company and a consultant. The activities of the 
company and the consultant as agents for D.L.W. consisted of the solicitation of 
orders, the recommendation of other sales agents, the ordering of samples, the 
promotion of D.L.W. products to potential customers through mail and showroom 
display, and attendance at trade shows and sales meetings. In affirming the dismissal 
for lack of personal jurisdiction, the court stated: 
Although many courts cite Perkins [v. Benguet Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 
(1952)] for the principle that personal jurisdiction may be asserted where 
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the cause of action is unrelated to the forum activity, no court has ever 
held that the maintenance of even a substantial sales force within the state 
is a sufficient contact to assert jurisdiction in an unrelated cause of 
action. 
Id. at 1242 (emphasis added). 
In this case, State Line Hotel contracted with State Line Properties, Ltd., a Utah 
limited partnership, for the purpose of taking reservations for hotel rooms, gaming 
tournaments, golf tournaments and entertainment. Record at 12. The activities of State 
Line Properties, Ltd., on behalf of State Line Hotel, Inc. are similar to the activities of 
the California company and consultant as agents for D.L.W. in Cong oleum Corp. 
Accordingly, the activities of State Line Properties, Ltd. on behalf of State Line Hotel, 
Inc. are insufficient to confer general jurisdiction over State Line Hotel, Inc. for the 
purpose of litigating unrelated causes of action. 
In MGM Grand, Inc. v. District Court, 807 P.2d 201 (Nev. 1991), MGM sued 
Walt Disney Company seeking a declaratory judgment permitting it to use the MGM 
name, logos and trademarks on a movie theme park it intended to build in Las Vegas. 
Disney moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, and the district court granted 
the motion. MGM argued, however, that Disney, because of its contacts with Nevada, 
was subject to the general jurisdiction of Nevada's state courts. The Nevada Supreme 
Court disagreed. 
Our conclusion that an exercise of personal jurisdiction would be 
improper is bolstered by an examination of each of the potential bases for 
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jurisdiction. To begin, the exercise of general jurisdiction is not 
appropriate, because Disney's own contacts with the State of Nevada, 
which amount to no more than advertising and promoting the company's 
California theme parks, are neither continuous nor systematic. See 
Munley v. Second Judicial District Court, 104 Nev. 492, 496, 761 P.2d 
414, 416 (1988) (in-state advertising and promotion not sufficient to 
create general jurisdiction). 
807 P.2d at 203 (emphasis added). 
Finally, in Price & Sons v. District Court, 831 P.2d 600 (Nev. 1992), the court 
held that the Nevada courts did not have general jurisdiction over an out-of-state 
membership department store, the Price Club, which had over 1,000 members in 
Nevada. The Price Club regularly sent advertisements to its members and solicited 
memberships in Nevada through an advertising flyer distributed through a Nevada 
credit union. The court noted that general personal jurisdiction over a defendant for 
any cause of action is appropriate where the defendant's forum activities are so 
substantial or continuous and systematic that the defendant may be deemed to be 
present in the forum state. "A high level of contact with the forum state is necessary to 
establish general jurisdiction. Sales and marketing efforts in the forum by a foreign 
corporation, without more, are insufficient to establish general jurisdiction." Id. at 601 
(emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
In this case, State Line Hotel advertises its hotel and casino operation in Utah 
and contracted with a Utah limited partnership to take reservations from Utah residents 
for hotel rooms, gaming tournaments, golf tournaments and entertainment. State Line 
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Hotel's promotion of its Nevada hotel and casino is no different from Walt Disney's 
promotion of Disneyland or a destination resort's promotion of its facilities to citizens 
of other states. Advertising in a forum state is not tantamount to having a presence 
there. State Line Hotel does not do business in Utah and is not amenable to general 
personal jurisdiction. 
Plaintiff claims that State Line's advertising and promotional activities are 
sufficient to confer general personal jurisdiction, citing Weintraub v. Walt Disney 
World, 825 F. Supp. 717 (E.D. Pa. 1993), in support. Weintraub, however, involved 
much more extensive forum contact that mere advertising. The key in Weintraub was 
activities of Disney in the forum, including conducting a business seminar in 
Pittsburgh, Disney representatives visiting Pennsylvania for college relations, Disney 
representatives visiting Pennsylvania for professional staffing purposes, and Disney's 
publicity staff visiting Pennsylvania. Id. at 721-22. 
Similarly, Gavigan v. Walt Disney World Co., 630 F. Supp. 148 (E.D. Pa. 
1986), involved more extensive activities than merely advertising and promoting the 
theme park. On reconsideration, 646 F. Supp. 786, the court emphasized that Walt 
Disney World recruited the City of Philadelphia to join in promoting the theme park. 
In connection with the "Disney Salutes Philadelphia" campaign, city representatives 
spent two days at Walt Disney World at Disney's expense. These activities (and 
others) were in addition to advertising. 646 F. Supp. at 788. 
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Plaintiff also relies on Boone v. Silver Creek Resort, Inc., 749 F. Supp. 495 
(S.D. Ind. 1990), which involved an Indiana resident's injury at a Kentucky resort. 
The distinguishing factors in Boone were that the resort owners only mailed 
promotional materials to Indiana residents who had prior connection with the resort 
through previous inquiry or visits (not to Indiana residents in general). The court 
apparently believed an un-targeted advertising campaign would be less likely to resuL 
in general personal jurisdiction. Significant, also, was the fact that the resort owner 
annually attended an Indianapolis boat show and there entered into "contractual 
relationships with Indiana residents whereby prospective guests make a down payment 
and sign a written agreement to use the resort." Id. at 198 n.5. 
B. State Line's Leasing Incidental Parcels of Real 
Property in Utah is not Enough to Confer General Jurisdiction 
With respect to the State Line Hotel's leasing of real property in Wendover, 
Utah, the trial court observed and ruled: 
I think the leasing of incidental parcels, and in that, I am including 
the signage and the parking structure and the parking lot. While those are 
clearly directly related to the carrying on of a casino business, they're not 
integral in the sense that the casino could not, in some fashion or another, 
continue. 
The leasing of those parcels is insufficient to convey general 
jurisdiction such that the defendants are liable for all of their actions to 
any Utah plaintiff in a Utah court. 
Certainly, if one of the leased parcels was the [site] of the slip and 
fall, that would be sufficient; but I guess I'm just troubled by a slip and 
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fall occurring in Nevada, resulting in jurisdiction in Utah when there is 
not a generalized presence in Utah. 
Record at 270, p. 21. 
Plaintiff has not cited any authority for the proposition that a foreign defendant's 
leasing incidental parcels of real property in the forum state will result in the 
defendant's being haled into court for all purposes. 
Plaintiff does, however, miscite Hebertson v. Willowcreek Plaza, 895 P.2d 839 
(Utah Ct. App. 1995), apparently for the proposition that leasing real property may 
result in a finding of general personal jurisdiction. The sole issue in Hebertson was 
whether the owners of the real property on which the plaintiff was injured did business as 
Willowcreek Plaza, which was the name given to the property. Id. at 840. The court, 
however, made reference to doing business for jurisdictional purposes and listed the 
ownership of property as a factor to consider. Id. at 840-41. The court cited Radcliffe v. 
Akhavan, 875 P.2d 608 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). As set forth below, Radcliffe was a specific 
personal jurisdiction case. 
As the trial court found, State Line Hotel's leasing of small parcels of real property 
in Wendover, Utah, for purposes incidental, but not necessary, to its hotel and casino 
business in Wendover, Nevada, is insufficient to justify conferring general personal 
jurisdiction over State Line. 
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C. The Relationship of State Line Hotel, Inc. to the 
Utah Entities is Irrelevant 
Plaintiffs smoke screen issues include the Nevada corporate defendant's 
relationship to some Utah entities and the insurance policy's coverage of these entities 
and other related entities in the same policy. Plaintiff neither cites authority for her 
contention that these circumstances support conferring general personal jurisdiction, 
nor does she explain the significance. In fact, the circumstances are legally irrelevant. 
In Quarles v. Fuqua Industries, Inc., 504 F.2d 1358 (10th Cir. 1974), a case 
involving a non-resident parent company of a resident subsidiary company, the court 
noted that a "parent company has a separate corporate existence and is treated 
separately from the subsidiary in the absence of circumstances justifying disregard of 
the corporate entity." Id. at 1362. "Circumstances justify disregard of the corporate 
entity if separation of the two entities has not been maintained and injustice would 
occur to third parties if the separate entity were recognized." Id. 
Plaintiff argues, essentially, that because the defendant Nevada corporation, 
State Line Hotel, Inc., has some ownership interest in State Line Properties, Inc., a 
Utah corporation, State Line Hotel can expect to be haled into court in Utah for general 
purposes. The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit recognized, however, that unless 
corporate formalities have not been followed, the separate corporate existence is 
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recognized. Id. Plaintiff presented no evidence whatsoever relating to corporate 
formalities.1 
D. Utah Specific Personal Jurisdiction Cases 
do not Support Conferring General Personal Jurisdiction 
Plaintiff cites three Utah cases in support of her argument that the trial court 
should have exercised general personal jurisdiction over State Line Hotel.2 In Radcliffe 
v. Akhavan, 875 P.2d 608 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), Kauftnann (the non-resident) and 
Akhavan entered into an agreement for Kauftnann to buy Akhavan's interest in a Utah 
1
 At the conclusion of the hearing on State Line Hotel's Motion to Dismiss, the trial 
court set the matter for an evidentiary hearing at Plaintiffs suggestion and allowed Plaintiff some 
limited discovery on "the question of doing business within the State of Utah not related to 
advertising or common stockholders, but simply the question of whether they exercise the privilege 
of doing business within the State[.]" Record at 269, p. 28. At the scheduled evidentiary hearing, 
Plaintiff elected not to present evidence. Record at 270. Instead, Plaintiff filed a supplemental 
memorandum prior to the hearing. Record at 104-162. 
This is significant. In Anderson v. American Society of Plastic and Reconstructive 
Surgeons, 807 P.2d 825 (Utah 1990), the court held that pretrial jurisdictional issues could be 
determined based on affidavits alone, discovery or an evidentiary hearing. Id. at 827. If the 
determination proceeded on documentary evidence alone (affidavits or discovery), Plaintiff is only 
required to make a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction. Plaintiffs factual allegations are 
accepted as true unless controverted by affidavits or depositions, but factual disputes are to be 
resolved in Plaintiffs favor and the court cannot weigh evidence unless a hearing is held. Id. 
As indicated, at the hearing on Defendant's motion to dismiss, Plaintiff suggested that 
an evidentiary hearing may be appropriate and the court agreed. Record at 269, p. 27. Plaintiff 
engaged in written discovery, declined to take depositions and declined to call witnesses and present 
evidence at the evidentiary hearing. Plaintiff cannot now claim that she was only required to make 
a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction because the court's jurisdiction ruling was based on 
discovery and affidavits. Once she requested and got her evidentiary hearing, she was required to 
meet her burden of proving jurisdiction. 
2
 Radcliffe v. Akhavan, 875 P.2d 608 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); Bradford v. Nagle, 763 P.2d 
791 (Utah 1988) and Hebertson v. Willowcreek Plaza, 895 P.2d 839 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
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corporation. Thereafter Kaufmann's agent sued Akhavan and others for fraudulent 
misrepresentation and Akhavan counterclaimed against Kaufmann and others for breach 
of contract. 
The Court held that Akhavan's claim against Kaufmann "clearly [arose] from 
Kaufmann's transaction of business within this state." Id. at 611. The Court noted 
that the issue was governed by the long-arm statute, UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-24, 
which provided that any person who transacts business in Utah, submits himself to the 
jurisdiction of Utah Courts as to any claims arising from transacting business in Utah. 
The Court also held that finding personal jurisdiction over Kaufmann did not violate 
due process because he met with Akhavan in Utah on three occasions to negotiate the 
purchase of the business and thus anticipated being haled into court in Utah. Id. at 612. 
Bradford v. Nagle, 763 P.2d 791 (Utah 1988), also involved a lawsuit arising 
out of a contractual relationship between a non-Utah resident and Utah residents. In 
that case, Bradford, a Mississippi native, came to Utah and negotiated the purchase of 
an apartment. When the seller refused to buy the apartment back under the terms of 
the contract, Bradford sued in Mississippi, obtained a default judgment and attempted 
to enforce the judgment in Utah. The contract was signed by Bradford in Mississippi 
and there were some communications between the parties in their respective states, but 
the trial court ruled that the contacts were insufficient and set the judgment aside. The 
Supreme Court upheld the trial court. As in Radcliffe v. Akhavan, the analysis was 
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only under the long-arm statute. The Court ruled in Bradford that assuming that the 
Utah residents' conduct fell under Mississippi's long-arm statute, there were 
insufficient contacts to satisfy constitutional due process requirements. Id. at 794. 
The Court noted: 
In the instant case, [the Utah] defendants did not solicit the sale of 
the property. Rather, it was plaintiff who initiated the negotiations by 
telephone after personally inspecting the property in Utah. The contract 
of sale was to be performed solely in Utah, and the fact that part payment 
was received from Mississippi is, in this case, insufficient to fulfill 
minimum contact requirements. Defendants did not visit Mississippi, nor 
did they deliberately engage in "significant activities" or purposefully 
create "substantial connections," continuing relationships, and obligations 
with Mississippi residents to give defendants a fair and reasonable 
warning that their activity would subject them to Mississippi's 
jurisdiction. 
Id. at 795. Plaintiff also cites to Hebertson v. Willowcreek Plaza, 895 P.2d 839 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1995), for reasons that are unclear. 
Cases such as Radcliffe and Bradford involving, as they do, conduct specified in 
long-arm statutes, out of which the causes of action arose, are not dispositive or helpful 
in resolving in this case whether the Court should exercise personal jurisdiction over 
the State Line. Plaintiff points to contacts the State Line has with Utah, but Plaintiff's 
cause of action did not arise out of those contacts. Utah's long-arm statute clearly 
requires the conduct to arise out of specified contacts for the court to exercise special 
personal jurisdiction. UTAH CODE ANN. §78-27-24(1996). 
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It is only if general personal jurisdiction exists (as contrasted with specific 
personal jurisdiction, arising under the long arm statute), that this lawsuit should 
remain in Utah. For general personal jurisdiction to exist, there must be "substantial 
and continuous local activity" to the point that the defendant is "doing business" in the 
foreign state. See Mallory Engineering, Inc. v. TedR. Brown & Assoc, 618 P.2d 
1004 (Utah 1980); Abbot GM. Diesel, 578 P.2d 850 (Utah 1978) (both citing Strachan, 
In personam Jurisdiction in Utah, 1911 Utah L. Rev. 235 (1977)). the Court in Price 
& Sons v. District Court, 831 P.2d 600 (Nev. 1992), noted, "[a] high level of contact 
with the forum state is necessary to establish general jurisdiction." Id. at 601. 
In her brief, Plaintiff points to a couple of service contracts (out of 28 
vendor/service contracts identified in discovery), a few leases {not ownership) of real 
property in Wendover on the Utah side, and some telephone numbers to support her 
argument that the State Line has sufficient contacts with Utah to justify a finding of 
personal jurisdiction. Virtually all people and businesses have contact with other states. 
Even numerous small contacts do not constitute substantial and continuous local activity 
tantamount to doing business. The State Line Hotel, Inc., does business in Nevada, but 
deals with some Utah businesses, many Nevada businesses and businesses in various 
other states in carrying out its Nevada business. 
The State Line has been very careful to keep its doing of business in Nevada. 
(Indeed, its business is uniquely Nevadan by nature.) It does not own property in Utah; 
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it does not employ people in Utah. It is absolutely irrelevant what contacts the Utah 
entities, State Line Properties, Inc. and Ltd., have with Utah. The issue is what State 
Line Hotel, Inc., does in Utah. Plaintiff has failed to meet her burden of proving that 
the State Line has substantial and continuous local activity in Utah. 
II. 
PLAINTIFFS INJURIES DID NOT ARISE OUT OF DEFENDANT'S 
CONTACTS WITH UTAH; THEREFORE, NO SPECIFIC 
PERSONAL JURISDICTION EXISTS 
To determine whether specific personal jurisdiction over State Line Hotel, Inc. 
exists, one must turn to Utah's long arm statute. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-24 (1996) 
provides: 
Any person . . . whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, 
who in person or through an agent does any of the following enumerated 
acts, submits himself . . . to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state as 
to any claim arising from: 
(1) the transaction of any business within this state; 
(3) the causing of any injury within this state whether tortious or 
by breach of warranty . . . . 
(Emphasis added). 
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A. Plaintiff's Injuries Must Arise Out of Defendant's Contacts 
With Utah for the Long Arm Statute to Apply 
Plaintiff's injuries did not arise from the transaction of any business by the 
Defendant within Utah. Plaintiff was not injured as a result of advertising or promotion 
of the State Line Hotel, nor as a result of State Line Hotel, Inc.'s obtaining goods and 
services from Utah vendors and businesses nor as a result of State Line's leasing 
incidental parcels of real property in Utah. See record at 270, p. 21. Unquestionably, 
the injury was not caused in Utah. 
There is no question but that the alleged injury must arise out of the Defendants' 
contacts with Utah for Utah to exercise specific personal jurisdiction over Defendants 
under the long-arm statute. Roskelley & Co. v. Lerco, Inc., 610 P.2d 1307, 1311 
(Utah 1980). In Roskelley, the Utah Supreme Court stated that it does not assist 
plaintiff to show the contacts defendant has with Utah if the specific litigation does not 
arise out of any of these contacts. Id. See also Abbot G.M. Diesel, Inc. v. Piper 
Aircraft Corp., 578 P.2d 850, 853 (Utah 1978) ('"where the defendant has only 
minimum contacts with the forum [i.e., no general jurisdiction exists], personal 
jurisdiction may be asserted only on claims arising out of the defendant's forum-state 
activity.'") (citation omitted.) 
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Finally, there is a constitutional "due process" element to personal jurisdiction. 
InArguello v. Indus. Woodworking Machine Co.} 838 P.2d 1120 (Utah 1992), the Utah 
Supreme Court stated: 
To exercise jurisdiction consistent with due process, the non-
resident defendant must have "minimum contacts with the forum state 
such that the maintenance of this suit does not offend 'traditional notions 
of fair play and substantial justice.f" 
Id. at 1123, quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). 
The defendant must have purposefully availed itself of the privilege of 
conducting activities in Utah and must have reasonably anticipated being haled into 
court in Utah. Kamdar & Co. v. Laray Co.} Inc., 815 P.2d 245, 249 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991) (citations omitted). In addition, the court must balance the convenience of the 
parties and the interests of the state in assuming jurisdiction by examining the 
relationship of the defendant, the forum and the litigation to each other. Id. 
Although State Line Hotel purposefully availed itself of purchasing advertising, 
food products and supplies in Utah, it cannot be said that, as a result, it reasonably 
anticipated being summoned into a Utah court for a slip and fall accident that occurred 
in Nevada, on its premises. 
In World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980), the United 
States Supreme Court discussed the concept of minimum contacts. It stated: 
It protects the defendant against the burdens of litigating in a distant or 
inconvenient forum. And it acts to ensure that the States, through their 
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courts, do not reach out beyond the limits imposed on them by their status 
as coequal sovereigns in a federal system. 
Id. at 292 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). The Court noted that although the 
limits imposed on state jurisdiction by the due process clause have been relaxed over 
the years, "we have never accepted the proposition that state lines are irrelevant for 
jurisdictional purposes, nor could we, and remain faithful to the principles of interstate 
federalism embodied in the Constitution." Id. at 293. The Court noted that although 
the framers of the Constitution foresaw that the nation would be a common market, 
they also 
intended that the States retain many essential attributes of sovereignty, 
including, in particular, the sovereign power to try causes in their courts. 
The sovereignty of each State, in turn, implied a limitation on the 
sovereignty of all its sister States - a limitation express or implicit in both 
the original scheme of the Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Id. at 293. 
Finally, the Court observed that the due process clause does not contemplate that 
a state can make binding judgments against individuals or corporate defendants with 
which the state has no contacts, ties or relations. 
Even if the defendant would suffer minimal or no inconvenience from 
being forced to litigate before the tribunals of another State; even if the 
forum State has a strong interest in applying its law to the controversy; 
even if the forum State is the most convenient location for litigation, the 
Due Process Clause, acting as an instrument of interstate federalism, may 
sometimes act to divest the State of its power to render a valid judgment. 
Id. at 294 (citing Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958)). 
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In applying the relevant factors listed by the Court in determining the 
reasonableness of requiring a foreign defendant to litigate a case in the forum, none of 
the factors support keeping this case in Utah. Utah has little interest in adjudicating 
this personal injury lawsuit which arose in Nevada between a Nevada corporation and a 
Utah resident. Certainly Utah has much less interest in adjudicating this dispute than 
does Nevada. Although the Plaintiff has an interest in obtaining convenient and 
effective relief, her interests would have been promoted by litigating her suit in 
Nevada, a state which has a keen interest in ensuring safe environments for visitors to 
its hotels and casinos. 
B. Plaintiffs Injuries Did Not, Factually or Legally, Arise Out of 
Defendant's Advertising Its Business in Utah 
In her complaint, Plaintiff alleges a negligence cause of action. Record at 1-4. 
She claims she slipped and fell while walking through a food buffet line, that Defendant 
owed her a duty to act in a reasonable and safe manner and that it breached that duty. 
She claims she was injured as a result and is entitled to special and general damages. 
In her brief, however, Plaintiff claims that this court has specific personal 
jurisdiction over the State Line because her injury arose out of State Line's advertising 
and promotional activities in Utah. Brief of Appellant at 15-16. 
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There is no record support for Plaintiffs claim that her injuries arose from 
Defendant's advertising, but even if there were, that would not change the fact that her 
injuries did not arise out of the advertising. 
Plaintiff relies on two decisions from the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 
both of which have been vacated or reversed? Plaintiff relies on Alexander v. Circus 
Circus Enterprises, Inc., 939 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1991), for that court's analysis, which 
is that but for the defendant's forum-related activities in soliciting business, the plaintiff 
would not have gone to the defendant's place of business and been injured. Id. at 853. 
The court in Alexander relied on Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 897 F.2d 377 (9th 
Cir. 1990). 
As stated, neither Alexander nor Shute are good law. In Alexander v. Circus 
Circus Enterprises, Inc., 972 F.2d 261 (9th Cir. 1992), the court of appeals withdrew 
its earlier opinion reported at 939 F.2d 847, upon which Plaintiff relies. In the later 
decision, the court granted the defendant's petition for rehearing, withdrew its prior 
opinion, and affirmed the district court's quashing service of summons and dismissing 
the complaint based on absence of personal jurisdiction. 972 F.2d at 262. Shute was 
reversed in Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991). On remand to 
the Ninth Circuit, 934 F.2d 1091, the court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the 
3
 Plaintiff also relied on these cases below, record at 39, 45-47, and State Line pointed 
out below that the cases were no longer good law. Record at 75-76. 
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district court which had originally granted the cruise line's motion for summary 
judgment on lack of personal jurisdiction. 
To the extent the Ninth Circuit's "but for" analysis survives, however, it is a 
distinctly minority position and has been sharply criticized. In State ex rel. Circus 
Circus v. Pope, 317 Or. 151, 854 P.2d 461 (1993), the Oregon Supreme Court rejected 
the plaintiff's request to adopt the "but for" test. 
The Supreme Court of the United States does not apply a "but for" test, 
and our reading of the pertinent Supreme Court cases convinces us that 
the Supreme Court would not do so. We therefore decline Smith's 
invitation to adopt the proposed "but for" test. 
854-P.2d at 466. See also Wims v. Beach Terrace Motor Inn, Inc., 759 F. Supp. 264, 
267 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (most courts addressing the issue have concluded that when 
plaintiffs bring actions for personal injuries that occurred in another state and which 
allegedly resulted from the defendant's negligent acts which also occurred in another 
state, the cause of action does not arise from the defendant's forum contacts for 
purposes of asserting personal jurisdiction). 
In State ex rel. Circus Circus, the court noted that by advertising its Reno 
facilities in a major Oregon newspaper, providing brochures to the plaintiff's travel 
agent, making available to Oregon residents a toll-free telephone information service, 
and telephoning plaintiff to confirm his hotel reservations, defendant purposefully 
directed its activities at residents of Oregon. "However, Smith's negligence claim 
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against Circus Circus does not 'arise out of or relate to' the activities of Circus Circus 
in Oregon." 854 P.2d at 466 (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 
(1985)). The court noted that plaintiff claimed that he was injured by a bottle thrown 
from a window of a hotel and that his injuries resulted from Circus Circus's negligence 
relating solely to the operation of its hotel in Nevada. Id. 
Similarly, mMunley v. Second Judicial District Court, 761 P.2d 414 (Nev. 
1988), the court noted that even if Northstar's promotional activities in Nevada 
constituted transacting business, the plaintiff had failed to demonstrate that his cause of 
action arose from those activities. The court specifically noted that the plaintiff alleged 
in his Complaint that his injuries were proximately caused by the negligent 
management, maintenance and operation of the ski chair lifts in California. "Indeed, 
there is nothing in the record suggesting that Northstar's promotional activities in 
Nevada were related to its alleged negligence in maintaining and operating its 
California chair lifts." Id. at 415 (citations omitted). Significantly, the court held that 
Northstar's promotional activities did not confer jurisdiction on the district court "even 
though petitioner's trip to Northstar was in response to such promotional activities." 
Id. at 416 (citing Circus Circus Hotels, Inc. v. Superior Court, 120 Cal. App. 3d 546, 
174 Cal. Rptr. 885,900(1981)). 
The plaintiff in Munley, like the plaintiff herein, relied on Burger King Corp. v. 
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985), in claiming that his cause of action was required only 
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to "relate to" the defendant's acts in Nevada. The Nevada Supreme Court properly 
distinguished Burger King from the facts of the case before it. In Burger King, 
Rudzewicz, a Michigan resident, entered into a franchise contract with Burger King, a 
Florida corporation. Burger King thereafter sued Rudzewicz in Florida for breach of 
the franchise contract. In holding that Florida's long arm statute conferred jurisdiction 
on the Florida courts, the Supreme Court concluded that Rudzewicz had deliberately 
reached out beyond his home and established a substantial 20-year contractual 
relationship with Burger King in Florida. The court concluded that the franchise 
dispute grew directly out of a contract which was substantially connected to Florida. 
761 P.2d at 416. "The Burger King opinion thus suggests that the cause of action must 
have a specific and direct relationship or be intimately related to the forum contacts." 
Id. 
Plaintiff's specific personal jurisdiction argument is really a general personal 
jurisdiction argument because it urges the Court to find personal jurisdiction based on 
State Line's Utah activities for an injury which occurred out of state. In Union Ski Co. 
v. Union Plastics Corp., 548 P.2d 1257 (Utah 1976), the Utah Supreme Court 
observed that it is generally more fair and logical to find jurisdiction in the forum 
where the activity occurred out of which the cause of action arose. Id. at 1259. In this 
case, the Plaintiff's cause of action arose, not out of Defendant's transaction of 
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business, but out of alleged negligence which occurred in Nevada. Thus, there is no 
specific personal jurisdiction over Defendant. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, State Line Hotel, Inc., respectfully requests that the 
court affirm the trial court's dismissal of Plaintiff's complaint for lack of jurisdiction. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 19th day of August, 1998. 
MORGAN, MEYER & RICE 
CynthikK.C. Meyer 
Attorneys for Defendant State Line 
Hotel, Inc. 
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